

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0315

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, MBFR, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JUNE 6, SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV GAVE US REP AND DEP REP PREVIEW OF EASTERN RESPONSE TO WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19 WHICH SOVIETS SAID WOULD BE PRESENTED IN INFORMAL SESSION JUNE 7 AND ALSO IN THE PLENARY SESSION ON JUNE 8. SEVERAL ASPECTS OF EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE STILL UNCLEAR AND MAY NOT BECOME EVIDENT UNTIL THERE IS ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THEM. END SUMMARY.

2. TARASOV WELCOMED US REPS AND SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE THEM A PREVIEW OF EASTERN PROPOSALS TO BE PRESENTED IN THE INFORMAL JUNE 7 AND PLENARY JUNE 8. HIS PRESENTATION WAS AS FOLLOWS: ANALYSIS BY THE WARSAW TREATY PARTICIPANTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19 GIVES GROUNDS TO STATE THAT ALTHOUGH THESE PROPOSALS TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SOME IDEAS OF THE EASTERN

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PARTICIPANTS AND CONTAIN SOME CONSTRUCTIVE ASPECTS, IN MAJOR ASPECTS THE WEST STILL REMAINED AT ITS PREVIOUS POSITION. THIS WAS REFLECTED FIRST OF ALL IN THE REQUIREMENT OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT ASYMMETRICAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. THERE WAS ALSO NO CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION AS REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. ALL THIS, AND NOT ONLY THIS, GAVE GROUNDS FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO SAY THAT THESE PROPOSALS

DID NOT PROVIDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL COULD BE TAKEN AS A BASIS OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT.

3. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, AFTER THE NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION, GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD DECIDED TO SET FORTH THEIR NEW AND, IN PRINCIPLE, IMPORTANT INITIATIVE. THIS INITIATIVE TAKING CONSTRUCTIVELY INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS PROCEEDED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE FORCE REDUCTIONS AND FROM THE FACT OF THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ITS ESSENCE CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING: (1) WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AND APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE EAST AND WEST, THE TWO SIDES WITHIN THREE TO FOUR YEARS WOULD BE ABLE TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PERCENTAGES. IN ABSOLUTE FIGURES, THE WEST WOULD REDUCE BY 91,000 MEN AND THE EAST BY 105,000 MEN. (2) IN THIS EVENT, ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS, THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD HAVE IN THE REDUCTION AREA EQUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, 900,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE, INCLUDING 700,000 MEN IN GROUND FORCES ON EACH SIDE. (3) THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO STAGES. IN SECRET

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THE FIRST STAGE, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR OWN (COMMENT: STARTING) STRENGTH. THIS MEANT THAT THE USSR WOULD REDUCE ABOUT 30,000 MEN AND THE USA ABOUT 14,000. USSR WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND WITHDRAW THREE DIVISIONS AS WELL AS 1,000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. THE USA WOULD WITHDRAW TWO TO THREE BRIGADES AND REDUCE ITS REMAINING FORCES BY OTHER UNITS AND SUBUNITS. IT WOULD ALSO REDUCE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 36 PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND 54 NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT. ACCORDINGLY, THE NUMBER OF TANKS AND THE ABOVE MENTIONED US NUCLEAR MEANS WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS. (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, ALSO SOVIET INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES) (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, ALSO SOVIET INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES) (4) THE REMAINING STATES OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR, IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE WITHIN TWO TO THREE YEARS AFTER COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE. AS THE OUTCOME OF ALL THESE REDUCTIONS, THERE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES (COMMENT: MANPOWER IS REFERRED TO) OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE COLLECTIVE LEVELS WITHIN THE LIMITS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND WITH THE OBSERVANCE OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS WHICH

WOULD NOT GIVE TO ANY STATE THE POSSIBILITY OF RESTORING OR,
ALL THE MORE, OF EXCEEDING ITS NUMERICAL STRENGTH EXISTING PRIOR
TO REDUCTIONS.

(5) IN THE SECOND STAGE, DURING THE FIRST YEAR, ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR
FORCES BY 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR
FORCES (COMMENT: PRESUBABLY, OF THEIR SIDE'S FORCES) SUBJECT TO
REDUCTION. WITHIN THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED
STATES (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS) WOULD RE-
DUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY THE REMAINING 60 PERCENT.

(6) IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US WOULD
FURTHER REDUCE THEIR FORCES, SO THAT, IN THE OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS,
THE TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF THE US FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD CORRESPOND
TO THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS BY OTHER NATO STATES AND THE TOTAL
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PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE
TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WARSAW TREATY
STATES.

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4. TARASOV SAID THIS WAS THE GENERAL ESSENCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. IN INFORMING US REPS ABOUT THESE NEW PROPOSALS, HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THEY HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF ISSUES WHICH THE WEST HAD INDICATED WERE VERY IMPORTANT FOR IT: FIRST, AN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS WAS GIVEN, THAT IS, FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AT 900,000 MEN, INCLUDING THE CEILINGS OF 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES. SECOND, REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CONFINED TO GROUND FORCES AS THE WEST HAD INSISTED AND, FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE AIR FORCES, A MAXIMUM UPPER LEVEL WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THIRD, IN THE FIRST STAGE, THERE WAS PROVIDED FOR NOT AN EQUAL NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS AS THE EAST HAD PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED, BUT REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES IN A RATIO OF 2:1. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT THESE NEW PROPOSALS PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT, IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THERE HAD BEEN SHAPED AND EXISTED AN APPROXIMATE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. AS HAD ALREADY BEEN SAID, ALL
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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE PART IN REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, AND EACH OF THEM SHOULD MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE REDUCTION PROPORTIONATE TO ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS, AS EASTERN REPS WERE CONVINCED, COULD LEAD TO A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY PROVIDED A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AND MUTUAL COMPROMISE BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT. SOVIET REPS HOPED THAT WESTERN REPS WOULD THOROUGHLY ANALYZE THESE PROPOSALS AND ACCEPT THEM AS A BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

5. US REP SAID HE APPRECIATED THIS ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE PRACTICE OF GIVING ADVANCE NOTICE WAS A USEFUL ONE. US REP COMMENT THAT TARASOV HAD CLAIMED THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION ON ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. TARASOV REPLIED THAT THIS WAS MEANT IN THE SENSE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA STILL REFUSED TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS AT ALL AND THE REDUCTION OF US AND USSR ARMAMENTS WAS CONFINED ONLY TO A LIMITED PACKAGE. US REP SAID SOVIET REPS PRESUMABLY ALG RECOGNIZED THAT THE WEST HAD IN FACT REDUCED ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR SOVIET ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. TARASOV SAID THE EAST HAD NOT SEEN ANY CHANGES IN THE WESTERN POSITION AS REGARDS REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID THE PREVIOUS WESTERN POSITION FOR WHICH THE EAST HAD REPEATEDLY CRITICIZED WEST WAS THAT THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND ALL OF ITS ARMAMENTS RESULTING IN A LIMITATION OF ALL SOVIET GROUND FORCE ARMAMENT. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THIS SINCE THE WESTERN POSITION COULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED IN THIS WAY. BUT EASTERN REPS THOUGHT WESTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD THE UNREALISTIC NATURE OF SUCH A REQUIREMENT. THAT IS WHY THE EAST CRITICIZED THIS ASPECT, MORE IN THE INTEREST OF CRITICISM, BUT NOT BECAUSE OF SERIOUS

EASTERN BELIEF IN THIS REQUIREMENT. MOREOVER, EASTERN REPS SAW THAT WESTERN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN BEFORE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF 19 APRIL, HAD BEEN VAGUE AND INDEFINITE.

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6. US REP SAID TARASOV HAD CHARACTERIZED THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS AS AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE APPROACH. HOW HAD THEY CALCULATED THESE PERCENTAGES?

7. TARASOV SAID EAST CALLED THEIR PROPOSALS EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS BY EACH NATO COUNTRY, 11.9 PERCENT WOULD NOT CORRESPOND EXACTLY TO THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS OF EACH WARSAW TREATY COUNTRY, 13 PERCENT. FOR THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, THEIR PERCENTAGE WOULD BE ABOUT 2 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR NATO. THIS FOLLOWED FROM THE FACT THAT EAST AND WEST WOULD BE REDUCING DIFFERENT NUMBERS IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE-- THE WEST 91,000 MEN AND THE EAST 105,000 MEN. IN ADDITION, THE EAST HAS FEWER PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE SO THE PERCENTAGE WOULD BE HIGHER FOR THIS REASON TOO. (COMMENT: THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS ON A SIDE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PERCENTAGE REDUCTION.)

8. US REP ASKED WHAT DID THE PROPOSED ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS MEAN?

9. TARASOV REPLIED THAT IT MEANT THAT IN THIS CASE THE EAST SEPARATED THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION FROM THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE LEVELS. THE EAST BELIEVED THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT NOT COLLECTIVELY BUT INDIVIDUALLY AND THAT EACH STATE SHOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION EQUIVALENT TO ITS NUMERICAL STRENGTH.

10. US REP ASKED HOW WOULD PARTICIPATION IN ARMAMENT REDUCTION BE CARRIED OUT BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US?

11. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO BE CARRIED OUT BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND THAT SPECIFIC DETAILS WOULD

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BE DETERMINED IN STAGE 2.

12. US REP ASKED WHETHER THE EAST EXPECTED NON-US WESTERN

PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE TO SUCH COMMITMENTS IN PRINCIPLE AS PART OF
THEIR PASE I COMMITMENT?

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13. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS EXPECTED THAT REDUCTION
IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD ALSO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE WAY DES-
CRIBED. THEY EXPECTED THAT IN A GENERAL FORMULATION IN STAGE 1,
ALL THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD EXPRESS IN PRINCIPLE
THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE NOT ONLY MANPOWER BUT THE ARMAMENTS
OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AS WELL.

14. US REP ASKED WHETHER EAST FORSAW A PROVISION IN THE
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD OBLIGE PARTICIPANTS TO CARRY OUT THEIR
OBLIGATIONS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH PHASE I EVEN IF AGREEMENT
WAS NOT REACHED IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS?

15. TARASOV REPLIED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED
FOR SUCH A PROVISION AND DETAILS WOULD BE GIVEN IN THE INFORMAL
SESSION.

16. US REP ASKED FOR A CONFIRMATION ON HOW THE U PERCENT

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REDUCTIONS WOULD BE COMPUTED IN THE FIRST STAGE.

17. TARASOV REPLIED THIS WOULD BE 7 PERCENT OF THE GROUND FORCE STRENGTH OF THE USSR AND USA RESPECTIVELY.

18. US REP ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF TARASOV'S STATEMENT ON LIMITATIONS ON THE COLLECTIVITY OF RESIDUAL MANPOWER CEILINGS.

19. TARASOV SAID THE EAST WOULD ASK FOR OBSERVANCE OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS. THEY WOULD PRESENT DETAILS ON THIS IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 7.

20. US REP ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY THE US AND SOVIETS IN THE SECOND PHASE UNDER THE EASTERN PLAN.

21. TARASOV REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

22. US REP ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE LIMITS OR POST-REDUCTION LEVELS ON THE UNITS OF THE TYPE REDUCED.

23. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE DETAILS ON THIS IN THE NEXT DAY'S INFORMAL. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED FOR A CERTAIN REGULATION IN THIS CONTEXT.

24. US REP ASKED AGAIN ABOUT THE NATURE OF COMMITMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE I.

25. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED AS ITS MOST NECESSARY CONDITION A COMMITMENT BY EACH OF THESE PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES MANPOWER IN THE SECOND STAGE. THE EAST ALSO PROVIDED HERE FOR A CERTAIN REGULATION WHICH THEY
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WOULD DISCUSS IN THE NEXT DAY'S INFORMAL SESSION SO THAT FORCE REDUCTIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY FROM REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR ALTHOUGH DETAILS OF THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS.

26. US REP SAID THE EAST HAD POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD CHANGED THE NATURE OF STAGE I TO PROVIDE FOR A 2:1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS. TARASOV HAD ALSO SAID THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS SUBJECT TO REGULATIONS WHICH THEY WOULD SPECIFY AND TO DROP THE REQUIREMENT TO REDUCE AIR FORCES. AS TO MANPOWER, WAS THERE ANY OTHER CHANGE

FROM THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1976 POSITION IN THE NEW PROPOSALS?
US REP SAID THE EAST HAD CHANGED FROM A 17 PERCENT TO AN APPROX-
IMATELY 12 1/2 PERCENT REDUCTION FOR EACH PARTICIPANT, BUT THE
OUTCOME AT THE END OF BOTH STAGES WOULD BE THE SAME. IN BOTH
CASES, THE EAST WAS ASKING FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS, BUT
THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE SAME. THERE WAS APPARENTLY SOME
RELAXATION IN NATIONAL LIMITATIONS DEPENDING ON HOW THE DETAILS
OF THESE REGULATIONS LOOKED. WAS THIS A CORRECT SUMMARY?

27. TARASOV SAID NO, THIS WAS NOT SO. PREVIOUSLY, THE EAST
HAD PROPOSED THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT SHOULD REDUCE ITS
FORCES 15-17 PERCENT. SINCE THIS WAS APPARENTLY UNACCEPTABLE
TO THE WEST AND THE WEST HAD PROPOSED EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS
OF 700,000 AND 900,000 MEN, THE EAST HAD STARTED TO PROCEED IN
ITS THINKING FROM THESE LEVELS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
EASTERN CONCEPT, THE TOTAL REDUCTION FROM BOTH SIDES WOULD
HAVE CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 300,000 MEN. NOW SINCE THE
EAST HAD DECIDED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL
FOR EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS BY BOTH
SIDES WOULD AMOUNT TO 200,000 MEN. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE
THIS STEP WITH REGRET BUT DID SO IN THE INTERESTS OF COMPROMISE.

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28. US REP SAID THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL INVOLVED AN
EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. TARASOV SAID THE
PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOO NOW PROVIDE FOR EQUAL PERCENT-

AGE REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID SOVIET REPS HAD JUST SAID THAT NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR TO HIM HOW THIS APPROACH DIFFERED FROM THE EARLIER EASTERN ONE.

29. TARASOV SAID THE BASIC EASTERN APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE WAS THAT ALL THE REMAINING STATES, OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT ALTHOUGH DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE REGULATED IN PHASE II. THIS WAS THE EASTERN POSITION, BUT THE EAST WOULD NOT INSIST THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS SUBSCRIBE TO IT. THESE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO REDUCE PERSONNEL AND ARMAMENTS AND THEN UNDERTAKE SPECIFICALLY TO REDUCE THEIR MANPOWER. THE EAST HAD NOT CHANGED ALL OF THE DETAILS OF ITS PROGRAM BUT HAD SUGGESTED IMPORTANT COMPROMISES. THE DETAILS WOULD BE CLEARER AFTER THE
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PRESENTATION ON JUNE 7.

31. US REP SAID HE APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK THESE QUESTIONS. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE FURTHER QUESTIONS IN THE NEXT DAY'S INFORMAL SESSION, AND THEREAFTER. HE WOULD POINT OUT THAT, AS TARASOV WAS AWARE, THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS AS A WHOLE DID NOT ADDRESS WHAT THE WEST CONSIDERED THE MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE AREA, NAMELY THE FACT THAT WARSAW PACT HAD SIGNIFICANTLY MORE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THAN THE WEST. INSTEAD, THESE PROPOSALS ASSERTED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATE NUMERICAL PARITY IN THE AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT SELECTED US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER EASTERN REDUCTION IN MANPOWER AS WELL AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1700 TANKS AND FIVE DIVISIONS. THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL RETAINED THE US NUCLEAR REDUCTION BUT PRE-SUPPOSED ALMOST EQUAL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE EAST WAS OFFERING 1,000 TANKS AND SOME COMBAT VEHICLES.

32. US REP SAID HE WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT SOVIET REPS KNEW THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE WILGING TO ACCEPT A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON ITS MANPOWER AND REDUCED ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENT STATUS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US FROM OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE POSITION JUST PRESENTED BY TARASOV ADHERED TO THE SOVIET POSITION THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE TREATED ALIKE, NO MATTER WHAT THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES.

33. TARASOV SAID THERE STILL REMAINED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS REGARDED THE REAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THE WEST HAD MADE ITS PROPOSAL OF 19 APRIL CONDITION ON AGREEMENT ON DATA. SIMILARLY, THE EAST WAS MAKING

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ITS PROPOSALS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON DATA.

34. US REP ASKED, DID THIS MEAN THAT IF PARTICIPANTS IN EAST AND WEST AGREED THAT THESE WERE, SAY, 50,000 MORE WARSAW TREATY FORCES IN THE AREA, THEN THE EAST WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE THESE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS TO REDUCE ITS FORCES TO A COMMON CEILING?

35. TARASOV SAID, IF PARTICIPANTS TOOK AS A LEVEL OF THE EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILING 900,000 MEN FOR EACH SIDE THEN EACH SIDE SHOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES BY THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THESE FORCES EXCEEDED THE AGREED COMMON CEILING. THIS WAS THE MAIN ASPECT OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL.

36. US REP OBSERVED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THE EAST'S DATA ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THE EAST HAD APPARENTLY LEFT ROOM TO INCREASE ITS AIR FORCE MANPOWER UNDER THE CEILING. SHUSTOV SAID THIS WOULD BE THE CASE AND THE WEST COULD SO SO TOO, ALTHOUGH TO A LESSER EXTENT.

37. US REP SAID THEN, EVIDENTLY, THIS APPROACH INVOLVED REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA AS WELL AS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. SOVIET REPS SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. RESOR

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